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Introduction
In 1990 the Food and Drug Administration approved Norplant,
the first new contraceptive in over thirty years.' The Norplant Con-
traceptive System2 is a long-term contraceptive device for women.
The device is comprised of six capsules which are surgically implanted
in a woman's arm and gradually release levonorgestre 3 to provide
contraception for three to five years.4 Only a doctor can remove the
capsules. Because it is convenient, effective,5 and safe for many wo-
men, Norplant has been a financial success.6
Precisely these benefits have made it an attractive candidate for
the implementation of sweeping social policy. Soon after it came on
the market, there were proposals and even orders to compel the use of
Norplant. Only a week after the approval of Norplant, a California
trial court ordered a woman convicted of child abuse to be implanted
with the drug as a condition of probation.7 The judge in that case
articulated his goal as preventing the defendant from having, and po-
tentially abusing, any more children.8 Subsequently, other judges
compelled the use of Norplant for convicted female child abusers,9 but
the legality and constitutionality of such orders has yet to be decided
on appeal.
1. G.R. Huggins & Anne C. Wentz, Obstetrics and Gynecology, 265 JAMA 3139,
3139 (1991).
2. Norplant is the trade name for levonorgestrel.
3. Levonorgestrel is a member of a class of steroid hormones known as progestins.
4. Board of Trustees, American Medical Association, Requirements or Incentives by
Government for the Use of Long-Acting Contraceptives, 267 JAMA 1818, 1818 (1992).
5. Norplant is estimated to be at least 98.5% effective over five years. Id.
6. Wyeth-Ayerst Premarin Monopoly Doubles Sales In Two Years to $569 Mil. in 1991;
Norplant Implant Contributes $53 Mil. In First Year of Marketing, F-D-C RsP'. (The Pink
Sheet), Apr. 13, 1992, at 9-10.
7. Clerk's Transcript at 7, 44-45, People v. Johnson, No. F015316 (Tulare County
Super. Ct. filed in Cal. App. Ct. (5th Dist.) Feb. 25, 1991). The judge ordered this proce-
dure without her consent and despite the fact that the drug was contraindicated for a wo-
man in her medical condition. Id.
The California Court of Appeal was relieved of having to decide the legality of the
implantation order because Johnson violated another probationary term. The issue was
declared moot. Order of Dismissal at 2, People v. Johnson, No. F015316 (Cal. Ct. App.
(5th Dist.) entered Apr. 13, 1992).
8. Clerk's Transcript, supra note 7, at 44-45; see also William Grady & Erik Christian-
son, Judge Says Birth Curb Order Holds, Cm. TRIB., Apr. 30, 1993, § 2, at 1 (describing an
Illinois judge's sentencing order for a convicted child abuser which included implantation
with Norplant). The American Civil Liberties Union backed an Illinois bill which would
prohibit judges from ordering birth control in sentencing. Id.
9. See, e.g., Abusive Mother Accepts Contraceptive Implant, CH. TRIB., Feb. 10,1993,
§ 1, at 3; ACLU Will Challenge Norplant Sentence, UPI, Feb. 11, 1993, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, MAJPAP File.
Critics charge that doctors have misused the contraceptive. They
allege that doctors have enticed low-income women to have Norplant
implanted free of charge without informing them of removal costs,
failed to inform women of potential adverse side effects, and advised
poor and minority women against having Norplant removed once im-
planted.'" An overriding concern of Norplant's critics is that doctors
and politicians are targeting the contraceptive at low-income
women.
n
State legislators in Florida, Kansas, Louisiana, Tennessee, and
Washington recently introduced legislation ("the Norplant bills") to
provide "special assistance grants" to women on welfare who have
Norplant implanted. 12 In both Mississippi and Florida, state senators
are advocating conditioning the receipt of welfare by women on im-
plantation of Norplant.13 Bills pending in Washington and North Car-
olina would require Norplant implantation for mothers who have
given birth to a baby suffering from fetal alcohol syndrome or drug
addiction.' 4
After Norplant is surgically implanted, a woman using Norplant
cannot control her use of the contraceptive (as she could with birth
control pills, condoms, or other contraceptives) because of its continu-
10. Sally Jacobs, Norplant Draws Concerns Over Risks, Coercion, BOSTON GLOBE,
Dec. 21, 1992, at 1.
11. Laura M. Litvan, Norplant Program Assailed; Poor Black Girls Seen As Targets,
WASH. TimEs, Dec. 4, 1992, at B1; Paul W. Valentine, In Baltimore, a Tumultuous Hearing
on Norplant, WASH. Pos-r, Feb. 10, 1993, at D5. See S. 1154, 1993 N.C. Sess. (requiring the
Department of Human Resources to ensure that all AFDC-eligible women be encouraged
to use Norplant); S. 5335, 1993 Wash. Sess. (same).
12. S. 1886, 1993 Fla. Sess.; H.R. 2089, 1991 Kan. Sess.; H.R. 1584, 1991 La. Sess.
(original version); H.R. 1214, 1993 Tenn. Sess.; H.R. 1860, 1992 Tenn. Sess.; S. 5335, 1993
Wash. Sess., see also H.R. 342, 1993-94 Ohio Reg. Sess. (as introduced) (increasing on a
percentage basis the benefits to welfare mothers for implantation with Norplant). None of
these bills have become law.
More bills that would coerce Norplant use have already been introduced in 1994. See
H.R. 1252, 1994 Colo. Sess (requiring the state to credit inmates earned time for choosing
to undergo a vasectomy, tubal ligation, or implantation with Norplant); H.R. 5130, 1994
Conn. Feb. Sess. (directing a Norplant grant system which would pay an initial $700 and
$200 each year thereafter for women on AFDC for Norplant implantation); H.R. 1450,
1994 Fla. Sess. (as introduced) (establishing a pilot program of Norplant special assistance
grants for women on AFDC of an initial $200 and $400 per year thereafter); S. 2520, 1994
Fla. Sess. (as introduced) (allowing AFDC rate increased for Norplant implants or Depo-
Provera injections). But see A. 3593, 1993-94 Cal. Sess. (as introduced) (forbidding the
requirement that a person use contraceptives, including Norplant as a condition of receiv-
ing AFDC).
13. Jim Ash, Gannett News Service, Jan. 22, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
MAIPAP File; Don't Use Norplant Against Welfare Mothers, USA TODAY, Feb. 16, 1993,
at 10A; Barbara Kantrowitz & Pat Wingert, The Norplant Debate, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 15,
1993, at 36.
14. H.R. 1430, 1993 N.C. Sess.; S. 5249, 1993 Wash. Sess.
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ous effect until removal by a doctor at a cost of $150.15 Because of
this loss of individual control, the danger of coerced use is more signif-
icant with Norplant than with other forms of contraception. 16 The
Norplant bills raise serious constitutional and ethical problems.17 This
Note discusses the social assumptions behind the proposals to coerce
use of Norplant and how a constitutional challenge to such legislation
should be approached.
Part I describes proposed legislation, the arguments of the Nor-
plant bills' supporters and opponents, and the social assumptions un-
derlying those arguments. It concludes that the bills would effectively
rent a low-income woman's womb for the duration of the implant.18
Based on case law and the values underlying due process rights,
Part II discusses how substantive due process challenges to coerced
Norplant use should be decided. One such challenge to the Norplant
bills would assert that they violate a woman's right to privacy. Part II
traces the development of the right to privacy, including the recent
case of Planned Parenthood v. Casey. 9 This Part also discusses the
line of cases that articulates the dubious constitutionality of reducing
constitutional rights as a condition of receiving welfare benefits. Fi-
nally, Part II addresses the question of what constitutional standard a
court should apply to resolve a privacy challenge to a Norplant bill.
This Note argues that the Norplant bills are unconstitutional.
Part III discusses an equal protection challenge to the proposed
legislation based on gender, because only women's parenting rights
can be coercively removed under the Norplant bills. This Part traces
the development of equal protection doctrine and attempts to find
consistency among the cases. Part III argues that the Supreme Court
should take a closer look at what constitutes a gender classification,
and account for social stereotypes in legislation that might be charac-
terized as mere biological difference. This Part then analyzes the Nor-
plant bills under equal protection doctrine and concludes that men
and women are "similarly situated" in the area of reproductive control
because reproductive coercion would be feasible against both sexes.
The arguments that claim that men and women are not "similarly situ-
ated" for purposes of the Norplant bills are deeply riddled with
15. Jacobs, supra note 10, at 1.
16. For example, a woman can simply stop taking birth control pills.
17. The information, arguments, and constitutional challenges discussed in this Note
could apply equally to Depo Provera, a three-month contraceptive injected into women.
Depo Provera was recently approved by the Food and Drug Administration for use in the
United States. Stuart L. Nightingale, Contraceptive Injection Approved, 268 JAMA 3418,
3418 (1992); FDA's October 1992-Prepared Report of NDA Approvals, F-D-C REP. (The
Pink Sheet), Jan. 4, 1993, at 21-25.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 20-53.
19. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
WOMB FOR RENT
archaic stereotypes and are therefore an insufficient justification to
withstand constitutional analysis.
Although no Norplant bills have become law, it is likely that
some will in the near future due to the drastic money-saving measures
state legislatures are contemplating in an attempt to balance shrinking
state budgets. If the constitutional privacy and equal protection doc-
trines are to have meaning, these statutes must be struck down.
I. Proposals to Pay Women on Welfare to Use Norplant
All states include Norplant in their Medicaid services or have cre-
ated direct funding programs to afford access to the drug to poor wo-
men.20 Because the cost of Norplant is already covered for low-
income women, the purpose of the Norplant bills is not to defray the
approximately $500 to $800 cost of implantation,2 1 but to provide a
financial incentive for women to be surgically implanted with the
drug. Under the Kansas, Tennessee, and Washington bills, fertile wo-
men recipients of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)22
would have received a $500 initial "special financial assistance grant"
and $50 per year thereafter as long as Norplant or another "function-
ally equivalent contraceptive" remained implanted and "continue[d]
to be effective in preventing pregnancy."'  The Louisiana bill would
have paid an initial $100 "grant" and $100 per year thereafter.24 The
Florida bill, on the other hand, provides that an average AFDC fam-
ily's grant be increased from $258 per month to $400 per month upon
proof that the mother has been implanted with Norplant.25 No Nor-
plant bill has passed, but new bills are pending in Colorado, Connecti-
cut and Florida.26
A. Arguments For and Against the Norplant Bills
Proponents of the Norplant bills argue that "it's time we stopped
worrying about the rights of the mother and started worrying about
20. Julie Mertus & Simon Heller, Norplant Meets the New Eugenicists: The Impermissi-
bility of Coerced Contraception, 11 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 359, 361 (1992); Birth Con-
trol Implant Gains Among Poor Under Medicaid, N.Y. Ttmss, Dec. 17, 1992, at Al.
21. Warren E. Leary, U.S. Approves Injectable Drug as Birth Control, N.Y. TImEs,
Oct. 30, 1992, at Al. After an implantation paid for by Medicaid Ohio would provide a
grant. H.R. 342, 1993-94 Ohio Reg. Sess. at 4-5.
22. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-687 (1988).
23. H.R. 2089, 1991 Kan. Sess.; H.R. 1860, 1992 Tenn. Sess.; S. 5335, 1993 Wash. Sess.
If Norplant contraception failed, presumably a woman would lose her yearly grant.
24. H.R. 1584, 1991 La. Sess. (original version).
25. S. 1886, 1993 Fla. Sess.; see also H.R. 1199, 59th Leg., 1993 Colo. Sess. (Apr. 23,
1993 version).
26. See H.R. 1252, supra note 12; H.R. 5130, supra note 12; H.R. 1450, supra note 12;
S. 2520, supra note 12.
Spring 19941
832 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY Mol. 21:827
the rights of the children she's bringing into the world. '27 A propo-
nent of the Louisiana bill stated that taxpayers are "sick and tired of
working for other people. How long can we spend taxpayers' money
on irresponsible people[?] ' '28 Others favor coerced Norplant as one
way to end the cycle of poverty 2 9
Opponents characterize the bills as forcing Norplant implantation
upon women.3 0 They object to these bills as contrary to the funda-
mental rights to refuse medical treatment and to have children 1 Said
one commentator while discussing the policy of personal autonomy
inherent in these constitutional rights:
[T]he decision to undergo the surgical implantation of Nor-
plant-like the decision to undergo any type of surgery or use
any type of contraception-is a personal one that takes into ac-
count an individual woman's medical history, life circumstances,
and personal needs. In line with professional ethics, it is impera-
tive that women remain free to decide when to have Norplant
inserted and then removed. 2
According to the American Medical Association Board of Trustees,
"[g]overnment benefits should not be made contingent on the accept-
ance of a health risk. '33 Others are concerned that offering financial
incentives for Norplant use may make welfare more attractive for low-
income women.34
B. The Racial Premise of the Norplant Bills
The Norplant bills have inherent racial overtones. The public per-
ception is that welfare mothers are unmarried and non-white.3
Therefore, the Norplant bills may draw support from prejudice and
27. Matthew Rees, Shot in the arm; The use and abuse of Norplant, Nuw REPUBLic,
Dec. 9, 1991, at 16 (quoting Kansas Representative Kerry Patrick, author of the Kansas bill
H.R. 2089).
28. C.J. Fogel, Duke Bill for Welfare Moms Clears Louisiana House Panel, Gannett
News Service, May 23, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, MAJPAP File.
29. Walter A. Graham, Norplant Can Aid Mothers, USA TODAY, Feb. 16, 1993, at
10A.
30. Joyce Price, Forced Norplant Use Assailed, WASH. TnAEs, Apr. 2, 1992, at A5
(describing the American Medical Association Board of Trustees' condemnation of the
Norplant bills).
31. Id. The Supreme Court indicated that constitutional privacy rights may include
the right to refuse medical treatment in Cruzan v. Director, 497 U.S. 261,278 (1990). For a
discussion of the right to bear children, see infra text accompanying notes 54-61.
32. Mertus & Heller, supra note 20, at 361.
33. Price, supra note 30, at AS.
34. Rees, supra note 27, at 16.
35. Joanna K. Weinberg, The Dilemma of Welfare Reform: "Workfare" Programs and
Poor Women, 26 NEw ENG. L. REv. 415,422 (1991). Discussing the emerging public policy
trend of government to require recipients of AFDC to work as a condition of benefits,
Professor Weinberg asserts:
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racial stereotyping. 6 Certainly racism provides a partial motivation,
even if only on a subconscious level, for some politicians and medical
professionals who seek to prevent women of color from reproducing.
For others, this motivation may not be so subtle. The author of the
Louisiana bill, David Duke, is a former Grand Wizard of the Ku Klux
Klan.37 The problem of forced or coerced sterilization of women of
color is not a new one. Some doctors encourage poor women in labor,
especially those who do not speak English, to "consent" to steriliza-
tion? 8 For example, in Walker v. Pierce,39 a physician required an Af-
rican-American woman in labor, pregnant with her fourth child, to
consent to sterilization before assisting her in labor. Of all races in the
United States, studies show that Hispanic and African-American wo-
men are most likely to be sterilized.4°
C. The Norplant Bills Are More Than a Weak Incentive
Certain assumptions underlying the Norplant bills should be
noted. The first has to do with the concept of choice. The "grants"
that the bills provide effectively preclude poor women from deciding
for themselves whether to have a child. Compare United States v. But-
ler,41 where the Supreme Court acknowledged the coercive power of
spending when it struck down the Agriculture Adjustment Act
(AAA) on a spending power challenge. Under the AAA, the federal
government paid farmers (on a "voluntary" basis) to reduce their crop
acreage. The Court said:
The regulation is not in fact voluntary. The farmer, of course,
may refuse to comply, but the price of such refusal is the loss of
[Historically most women with children were not expected to work; the excep-
tions being slaves and indentured servants, and by extension, women of color.
However, as perceptions about the composition of welfare recipients has shifted
during the second half of the twentieth century, from widows to unmarried
mothers, and from white to non-white, there has also been a shift in the public's
mind away from the characterization of welfare recipients as "deserving."
Id. Therefore, argues Weinberg, legislators have imposed additional requirements and re-
duced benefits for recipients (as opposed to the more popularly funded program of Social
Security, 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-433 (1988), which benefits seniors of all income levels). Id. (ci-
tations omitted).
36. See Litvan, supra note 11, at D5; Valentine, supra note 11, at B1.
37. For allegations that the Duke proposal was racially motivated see Fogel, supra
note 28; Marlanee Schwartz, Duke Presses Louisiana Birth Control, WASH. POST, May 29,
1991, at A14.
38. GEORGE J. ANNAS ET AL., AMERicAN HEALTH LAW 986 (1990).
39. 560 F.2d 609 (4th Cir. 1977).
40. ANNAs Er AL., supra note 38, at 986.
41. 297 U.S. 1 (1936). The Court rejected Butler without overruling it in South Dakota
v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987), when it upheld the conditioning of federal highway funds on
states' adoption of 21-year-old drinking age. The Butler Court's recognition of the coercive
nature of monetarily-induced decisionmaking is still powerful by analogy.
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benefits. The amount offered is intended to be sufficient to ex-
ert pressure on him to agree to the proposed regulation. The
power to confer or withhold unlimited benefits is the power to
coerce or destroy. If the cotton grower elects not to accept the
benefits, he will receive less for his crops; those who receive pay-
ments will be able to undersell him. The result may well be fi-
nancial ruin.... This is coercion by economic pressure. The
asserted power of choice is illusory.42
The AFDC mother, like the Depression-era farmer, may well face the
choice between paying rent for her family or allowing implantation of
Norplant. If she declines the drug, she loses out financially.
Some may argue that the $50-$100 per year "grant" for using
Norplant is a pittance, too small to warrant a charge of coercion, but a
comparison of the size of a typical AFDC payment is revealing. Ten-
nessee and Kansas would pay the welfare mother $500 up front and
$50 per year thereafter. 43 In 1989, the average monthly AFDC pay-
ment per recipient in Tennessee was $61.49;44 in Kansas it was
$118.42.45 Louisiana would provide an initial $100 "grant" and $100
per year thereafter,46 while the 1989 average monthly AFDC payment
per recipient in that state was $55.76. 7 Florida would nearly double
the monthly AFDC grant for Norplant users.48 When compared to
general sustenance payments, the initial grants, and even the yearly
supplements, are a significant amount of money to these women.
One could argue that AFDC itself operates as an incentive for
recipients to have more children, and that Norplant grants would
merely equalize the incentives. Although AFDC payments in most
states do increase as the recipient has more children, this is not a ter-
rific financial incentive; each additional child is a cost to the parent far
beyond that made up by AFDC. Norplant grants, on the other hand,
provide additional funding without a corresponding increase in
expense.
This coercion has important social implications. The state's grant
may force women to act against their best physical interests, as Nor-
plant causes irregular menstruation, headaches, and breast discharge
in some women.49 Furthermore, the drug is contraindicated for wo-
men with thrombic disease, acute liver dysfunction, and breast can-
42. Id. at 70-71 (dictum) (footnotes omitted).
43. See supra text accompanying note 23.
44. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., Soc. SECURITY BULL. (Annual Statistical
Supplement) 306, Table 9.G2 (1991).
45. Id.
46. See supra text accompanying note 24.
47. U.S. DEP'T oF HEALTH AND HuMAN SERvs., supra note 44.
48. S. 1886, supra note 12.
49. Board of Trustees, supra note 4, at 1818.
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cer.51 Indeed, almost twenty percent of women who have chosen
Norplant in test studies have it removed within one year.5' Nonethe-
less, an indigent woman who does not want to have a child may forego
some other form of birth control that is better suited for her physical,
emotional, and sexual well-being, and subject herself to the potentially
adverse effects of the drug.
Alternatively, a poor woman may want to have a child. Her
choice, however, is reduced to a decision about her economic well-
being, severely altering what would otherwise be a choice between
different types of free medical care.52 Many parents consider econom-
ics in deciding whether to have a planned pregnancy; low-income par-
ents should not be insulated from this burden. But the difference
between setting sustenance levels for those on public assistance 53 and
economically coerced sterility is an important one.
The Norplant bills would offer a significant financial incentive to
the poorest women in America. These women are most vulnerable to
economic coercion because they are not only responsible for the care
of themselves, but also the care of their children. The decision to un-
dergo Norplant implantation and accept the grant cannot be charac-
terized as voluntary. The coercive nature of this "choice" is troubling
because it would cause some women to be implanted despite the fact
that the drug is against their best physical interests.
H. Substantive Due Process and the Norplant Bills
There are two lines of substantive due process "fundamental
rights" cases courts may use to determine the constitutionality of Nor-
plant statutes, if enacted. The first line develops the right of privacy in
the area of procreation. The second describes the constitutional im-
plications of the receipt of public benefits.
A. The Right to Procreative Choice
1. Strict Scrutiny and the Right to Privacy
The United States Supreme Court has a long history of protecting
the right to privacy, including decisions relating to procreation, finding
50. Id.; Incorrect Statement, 268 JAMA 2518, 2518, Nov. 11, 1992;
51. Mertus & Heller, supra note 20, at 367 (citing Bardin, Norplant Contraceptive Im-
plants, 2 Oa. & GYN,. REP. 96, 98 & Table 11 (1990)).
52. See, e.g., FLA. ADrrrN. CODE ANN. r. 1OC-7.042(4)(i) (1993).
53. Increasing AFDC benefits for women who have more than one child is appropri-
ate to equalize the tax benefits generally afforded custodial parents in which welfare
mothers cannot partake, since public assistance is not taxable. See Rev. Rul. 57-102,1957-1
C.B. 26. Custodial parents with taxable income may deduct $2,000 per year (with adjust-
ments) for each child, thereby reducing the parent's tax burden. I.R.C. §§ 151-152 (West
Supp. 1993).
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the right implicit in the protected "liberty" interest of the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 4 Two decades before the
Court articulated a general privacy right in Griswold v. Connecticut,5
the Court in Skinner v. Oklahoma56 unanimously declared that
"[miarriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence
and survival of the race. The power to sterilize, if exercised, may have
subtle, far-reaching and devastating effects. In evil or reckless hands
it can cause races or types which are inimical to the dominant group to
wither and disappear."57 Skinner, decided on equal protection
grounds, demonstrates a historical commitment to the protection of
reproductive rights.
In Griswold, the Court articulated a fundamental right of privacy,
and declared a right of married couples to use contraception.5 The
Court relied on Skinner to support this right of procreative privacy. 9
The right to contraception was later extended to unmarried couples in
Eisenstadt v. Baird,60 where the Court further defined the right to pri-
vacy: "If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the indi-
vidual .... to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to
bear or beget a child."61
Because these privacy rights are fundamental, the Court applies a
strict scrutiny analysis to protect against arbitrary and invidious dis-
criminations.62 To sustain a statute under strict scrutiny, its propo-
nents must demonstrate that a compelling governmental interest
necessitates the regulation and that the statute sweeps no broader
than necessary to support this interest.63
54. U.S. CONsr. amend. XIV; Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right of
married couples to contraception); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (right to interracial
marriage); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (right of unmarried couples to contra-
ception); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right to abortion); Cruzan v. Director, 497
U.S. 261 (1990) (right to refuse medical treatment).
55. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (plurality opinion).
56. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
57. Id. at 541 (holding a statute which compels sterilization for grand larceny but not
for embezzlement violates equal protection). The Court has not concluded that forced
sterilization would be unconstitutional under all circumstances. Id.; see Buck v. Bell, 274
U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (holding that forced sterilization of a "feeble-minded" woman does
not violate due process).
58. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.
59. Id. at 485; see also Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. 438 at 453-54 (also relying on Skinner to
support a broad right of privacy).
60. 405 U.S. 438.
61. Id. at 453.
62. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
63. Id.; Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685-86 (1977).
WOMB FOR RENT
2. The Casey Undue Burden Test
After several decades of protecting specified privacy interests, the
Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade" extended the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's protections to include the right of a woman to terminate a
pregnancy.6" Since that decision, the nation has become polarized on
this emotional issue, and the Supreme Court itself has fractured into
different camps, thereby muddying the rule of Roe and the privacy
right itself. In the most recent abortion decision, Planned Parenthood
v. Casey,66 the Court significantly altered Roe. In Casey, the Court
reaffirmed the "central holding" of Roe, namely, the "recognition af-
forded by the Constitution to a woman's liberty."'67 The Casey Court
quoted from Carey v. Population Services International" that a wo-
man's liberty interest
includes "the interest in independence in making certain kinds
of important decisions." While the outer limits of this aspect of
[protected liberty] have not been marked by the Court, it is
clear that among the decisions that an individual may make
without unjustified government interference are personal deci-
sions "relating to marriage, procreation, [and] contraception
),69
While the Casey Court recognized this ongoing privacy "right," the
plurality replaced the strict scrutiny test with an "undue burden" test,
permitting only a right to an abortion free from any undue govern-
mental burden before fetal viability.7" Under this test, the plurality
upheld several abortion restrictions, including a 24-hour waiting pe-
riod, a requirement of "informed consent," parental consent for mi-
nors, and state reporting requirements of the names and addresses of
the performing physician. The plurality struck down the spousal noti-
fication requirement as unduly burdensome.
71
In upholding these restrictions, the current Supreme Court has
expressed an unwillingness to consider the social reality that for cer-
tain women these restrictions may be excessive. Alternatively, they
are unwilling to find excessive restrictions to be undue. By taking
these stands, the Court ignores the realities of modern society. It
overlooks the minor who is raped by her father, and who then needs
to secure his permission to abort the fetus. It disregards the tempta-
tion by a girl to try a do-it-yourself abortion in an effort to not disap-
64. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
65. Id. at 153.
66. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992) (plurality opinion).
67. Id. at 2798.
68. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
69. 112 S. Ct. at 2811 (1993) (quoting Carey, 431 U.S. at 684-85).
70. Id. at 2819-20.
71. Id. at 2822-23.
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point her parents. It undervalues the onus of staying overnight and
taking a second day off from work that a 24-hour waiting period im-
poses on a woman travelling long distances to secure an abortion (or
having to confront the abortion-protestors a second time). The bur-
dens of many of these restrictions are exacerbated by poverty. For
reproductive restrictions to apply equally to all women, or at least not
to fall most heavily on the poor, the Supreme Court must apply the
"undue burden" standard in a manner that accounts for these social
realities.
This undue burden. test, however, only commanded a three-vote
plurality.72 The lack of clear consensus for the undue burden analysis
in Casey complicates privacy law. Because abortion and procreative
rights both fall within the constitutional rubric of "privacy," it is en-
tirely possible that the Casey decision will implicate the other rights
within the privacy classification, including the right to procreate and
the right to obtain contraception. It is unclear how the plurality, or
any of the other writing justices in Casey, intended to affect these
other privacy rights. Because a privacy jurisprudence was well devel-
oped before Roe, its existence may not be dependent on Roe's sur-
vival. Indeed, all of the writing justices seem to support the
correctness of these earlier decisions.73 Yet no Justice sets forth the
standard to apply in subsequent privacy cases.
If the test for the remaining privacy rights has changed from strict
scrutiny to the undue burden test after Casey, it appears that privacy is
a severely limited right and no longer fundamental. The Casey Court
seems to be either revoking the fundamental right status of privacy,
removing abortion from the right, or severely altering the nature of
substantive due process jurisprudence across the board. It is impossi-
ble to say, however, whether the plurality decision will ever be ac-
cepted by the majority of the Court. Indeed, more members of the
present Court agree that Roe should be overturned74 than agree with
the undue burden test. Even if a majority does eventually support the
undue burden test for abortion regulations, the Court may decide not
to apply the test to other privacy rights. Indeed, the last privacy deci-
72. This part of the judgment was joined by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter.
Id. at 2816. The remaining justices, none of whom adopted the undue burden test, con-
curred in part and dissented in part. Id. at 2838 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part); id. at 2843 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in
part, and dissenting in part); id. at 2855 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part, joined by White, J., Scalia, J., and Thomas, J.).
73. See id. at 2807 (plurality) ("We have no doubt as to the correctness of those deci-
sions."); see also id. at 2840 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing
these cases favorably); id. at 2844 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judg-
ment in part, and dissenting in part) (same); id. at 2859 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part) (same).
74. Id. at 2855 (Rehnquist, C.I., dissenting).
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sions to command a majority of the Court applied strict scrutiny. 5
B. Constitutional Welfare Law and Governmental Obstacles
When evaluating Norplant laws, courts may look to another line
of cases which contemplate the interface between the receipt of gov-
ernment benefits and constitutional rights. TWo questions will frame
the examination: whether a regulation penalizes the exercise of a fun-
damental right and whether the government, while providing general
medical services, can opt not to fund a medical procedure for the poor
when the right to the procedure is constitutionally protected by the
Equal Protection Clause.
1. Penalty vs. Non-penalty
In Shapiro v. Thompson,76 the Court held unconstitutional a one-
year residency requirement for welfare eligibility because it penalized
the exercise of the constitutionally protected right to travel.77 Simi-
larly, in Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County,7 8 the Court struck
down an Arizona statute requiring a year's residence in a county as a
condition of receiving non-emergency hospitalization or medical care
at the county's expense. The Court reasoned that the denial of a basic
"necessity of life" such as medical care penalized indigent persons for
exercising their right to travel.79 Memorial Hospital interpreted Sha-
piro to require application of strict scrutiny to determine whether the
non-citizens were afforded equal protection of laws that effected their
fundamental rights.80
In Dandridge v. Williams,"1 on the other hand, the Court used the
rational basis test' to hold that an upper cap on the size of AFDC
grants (no matter how many children a woman had) did not deny
equal protection.83 Although the Dandridge Court could have dis-
cussed a procreative right violation, the Court avoided the issue since
the case involved only "regulation in the social and economic field."'
75. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388-91 (1978); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
150-55 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
76. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
77. Id. at 629-31.
78. 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
79. Id. at 258-59.
80. Id. at 258-70.
81. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
82. .A statutory classification fails the rational basis test "only when [it] rests on
grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective." McGowan v. Mary-
land, 366 U.S. 420,425 (1961). It is the most permissive standard of review in equal protec-
tion jurisprudence.
83. Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 483-87.
84. Id. at 484.
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Dandridge is distinguishable from Shapiro and Memorial Hospi-
tal. In Shapiro and Memorial Hospital the government completely de-
nied a benefit to persons who exercised their right to travel. Indigent
persons were unable to obtain welfare or non-emergency medical care
benefits at all. In Dandridge, however, the welfare recipients still re-
ceived welfare, just a lesser amount per person than they would have
received had they not exercised their fundamental right to procreate.
This distinction justifies the different results in Dandridge compared
to Shapiro and Memorial Hospital.
It is difficult to predict whether the Court would hold Dandridge,
ShapirolMemorial Hospital, or neither controlling when evaluating a
Norplant bill. Under the Court's welfare jurisprudence, a penalizing
statute cuts or denies a benefit upon the exercise of a constitutional
right. A statute does not penalize a welfare recipient if it fails to in-
crease benefits to offset increased financial obligations incurred
through the exercise of constitutional rights.85 In the typical Norplant
bill, the state appears neither to totally deny a benefit, nor to refuse to
increase a benefit. Instead, the state creates a new benefit which a
woman can receive only if she gives up her right to procreate. An
enacted Norplant bill would pay a welfare recipient not to exercise her
right. While these three scenarios may have no effective difference to
the welfare recipient, the Court distinguishes among them.
Despite the incentive characteristic of the Norplant bills, they
should be properly recognized as creating a penalty against women
who choose another form of contraception or childbirth over Nor-
plant. Every woman on welfare capable of reproducing is entitled to
the grant. Only if a woman exercises her right of privacy is she denied
the special assistance grant. Certainly, this is characteristic of a pen-
alty. If a challenger can persuade a court that the Norplant bills cre-
ate a functional penalty for exercising a fundamental right, the court
should apply a strict scrutiny analysis to invalidate the legislation. 6
If the Supreme Court is to continue protecting constitutional
rights of welfare recipients, these bills should be held unconstitutional.
How can a constitution and a country assert that its citizens are vested
with certain rights if the state can simply purchase them for a term and
85. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977) (holding that withholding funding for
first-trimester abortions while fully funding child-birth expenses under the Medicaid pro-
gram did not "impinge" on a woman's right to an abortion); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438,444-
46 (1977) (holding that the Social Security Act permits a participating state to refuse non-
therapeutic abortions under its Medicaid plan).
86. The level of scrutiny applied to the Norplant bills will almost certainly determine
the outcome because almost no statutes pass strict scrutiny while almost all do pass the
rational basis test. See Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term-Forward: In
Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection,
86 HARV. L. REv. 1, 8 (1972).
Sr rin 1994]
thereby avoid their meaningful exercise?' A contrary holding by the
Court could have broad implications at direct odds with basic consti-
tutional protections. Would it be permissible for a city to offer $500 to
homeless protestors to refrain from marching because it would save
the costs of having to clean up and hire extra police? Would we toler-
ate an offer to pay $500 to any criminal defendant who agrees to rep-
resent herself at trial because it would be cheaper than the cost of
retaining an attorney? If these scenarios are impermissible, then so
should be the Norplant bills. The primary difference between these
examples and the Norplant bills is that those potentially affected by
the bills are on welfare. The Court has never allowed the mere receipt
of welfare to be a sufficient justification for the denial of constitu-
tional rights.88
2. Governmental Obstacles and the Abortion Funding Cases
In the abortion-funding cases, the Court again addressed the
question of whether the state can offer citizens a financial incentive
not to exercise a fundamental right.8 9 In these cases, the Court enter-
tained challenges to the Hyde Amendment,9" which denied use of fed-
eral Medicaid funds for most abortions.91 In each case, the Court held
that denial of federal funding did not "impinge" a fundamental right.92
The Court reasoned that the government placed no obstacle in
the path of the woman seeking to exercise her right that was not al-
87. Indeed, several courts and state legislatures have, on various grounds, disallowed
private parties from contracting for these rights in surrogacy cases. See, e.g., MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 722.859(1) (West 1992); In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988). But see
Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) (enforcing surrogacy contract). Certainly the
interest against state action in this area would be more compelling.
88. See, e.g., Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971) (holding that a home visit by a
social worker upon a welfare recipient is not a search and seizure for purposes of the
Fourth Amendment); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (holding AFDC payments to
be a protected property interest under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, which requires notice and a hearing prior to the cessation of benefits); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (holding unconstitutional a one-year residency require-
ment for welfare eligibility as it penalizes the right to travel); see also Parrish v. Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 425 P.2d 223, 230 (Cal. 1967) (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475-76
(1966); Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4, 7 (1966); People v. Stewart, 400 P.2d 97 (Cal.
1965), affd, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)) ("Both this court and the Supreme Court of the United
States have recently emphasized the heavy burden which the government bears when it
seeks to rely upon a supposed waiver of constitutional rights [by the receipt of public
benefits].").
89. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Beal
v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977).
90. Pub. L. No. 96-123, § 109,93 Stat. 926 (1979); Pub. L. No. 96-86, § 118,93 Stat. 662
(1979); Pub. L. No. 95-480, § 210, 92 Stat. 1586 (1978); Pub. L. No. 95-205, § 101, 91 Stat.
1460 (1977); Pub. L. No. 94-439, § 209, 90 Stat. 1434 (1976).
91. For a description of the various provisions, see Harris, 448 U.S. at 302-03.
92. Harris, 448 U.S. at 312-13; Maher, 432 U.S. at 471-74; Beal, 432 U.S. at 445-47.
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ready in existence had the state decided not to fund childbirth ex-
penses.93 "The regulation places no obstacles . . . in the pregnant
woman's path to an abortion. An indigent woman who desires an
abortion suffers no disadvantage as a consequence of [the state's] de-
cision to fund childbirth; she continues as before to be dependent on
private sources for the service she desires."94 In Harris v. McRae,95
the Court also indicated that one's possession of a constitutional right
does not mean that the government must fund its exercise.9 6 The
Court did say, however, that "government may not place obstacles in
the path of a woman's exercise of her freedom of choice . . .97
The Norplant bills, by contrast, would directly construct an obsta-
cle to a woman's exercise of her right to free reproductive choice.
Rather than allowing a woman the freedom to choose among various
forms of birth control, the state would coerce indigent women to be
temporarily sterilized.98 The difference between the Norplant bills
and the Hyde Amendment at issue in the abortion-funding cases is
one in kind rather than degree. In the Hyde Amendment, the federal
government decided which types of free care to offer women. Under
the Norplant schemes, the state funds options, but offers a staggering
monetary bonus to women who submit to the preferred method. This
distinction shows a court's option to hold the abortion funding cases
irrelevant to a Norplant challenge. As discussed in the Memorial Hos-
pital penalty analysis,9 9 the government's outright purchase of a wel-
fare recipient's constitutional rights should be sharply circumscribed.
C. Norplant Legislation and the Right to Privacy
The Norplant bills implicate the Fourteenth Amendment's sub-
stantive due process rights announced in privacy cases developed from
Griswold and its progeny.100 A Norplant statute would create a signif-
icant obstacle to a welfare mother's free choice to decide whether to
have another child or to choose a method of contraception.101 The
Norplant bills also share the penalizing features to welfare recipients
for the exercise of constitutional rights familiar from Memorial Hospi-
tal v. Maricopa County.0'z Under these cases, a court should apply
93. Beal, 432 U.S. at 474.
94. Id.
95. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See infra Part II.C.
99. See supra text accompanying notes 78-88.
100. See supra notes 55-63 and accompanying text.
101. Cf Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447 n.7 (1972).
102. 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
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either a strict scrutiny or "undue burden" standard to the Norplant
bills.
1. Strict Scrutiny
Under the strict scrutiny analysis called for in both privacy and
welfare case law, a statute must be narrowly tailored to further a com-
pelling state interest.10 3
a. State Interests Served by the Norplant Bills
One prominent state interest in the Norplant bills is to save the
government money, as Norplant laws would result in fewer children
on public assistance. In Shapiro v. Thompson," the Court rejected
governmental savings as a sufficient interest to warrant the denial of a
constitutional right.0 5
Another interest a state has in the bills is to prevent children
from being born into poverty. 0 6 This argument ignores, however, the
underlying social problems of living in poverty (such as poor educa-
tional opportunities, homelessness, and joblessness which contribute
to an inability to pull oneself out of poverty), and assumes that a life
in poverty is inherently less valuable than life outside of poverty.
Such short-sighted and classist views should not be the basis for the
denial of constitutional rights. Recipients of AFDC are largely depen-
dent on government to provide their basic necessities of life. The state
should not be permitted to exploit this dependency to achieve its eu-
genic goals. Therefore, this interest should not be considered
compelling.
A third state interest is to provide women on welfare the knowl-
edge and financing necessary to make educated and informed deci-
sions about their reproductive lives. This interest could be compelling
if the government were assisting women to decide what is in each wo-
man's own best interest based on her own physical, sexual, personal,
and religious needs.
b. Narrow Tailoring
Even if the state could assert such a compelling interest, the Nor-
plant bills fail the second prong of the strict scrutiny test-that the
103. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 150-55 (1973); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,
631, 634, 637-38 (1969).
104. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
105. Id. at 633 (Although a state can try to save money in its public assistance pro-
grams, "a State may not accomplish such a purpose by invidious distinctions between
classes of its citizens."); see Memorial Hosp., 415 U.S. at 263.
106. See Rees, supra note 27, at 16; supra text accompanying note 26.
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regulation be narrowly tailored to further the interest.10 7 The Nor-
plant bills sweep far more broadly than necessary to afford women the
means to make proper reproductive decisions. Every state currently
provides the funding necessary for poor women to be inserted with
the Norplant contraceptive. 8 This provides an ample opportunity
for women who want to use Norplant as their birth control to do so
free from coercion.
The state could argue that its interest in promoting birth control
is well served by Norplant use because Norplant is an extremely effec-
tive method with little room for human error or negligence. Even if a
woman wants to prevent conception, she is financially coerced into
using Norplant over another type of birth control, even though an-
other contraceptive may be a healthier alternative for her. Finally, a
woman who seeks to have a child, or who does not want to use contra-
ceptives for religious reasons, may face a significant impediment to
any decision to not use Norplant. The state could better advance its
interests in promoting responsible family planning by providing edu-
cational materials about all contraceptive choices and offering all
methods, including Norplant, free of charge.
2. The Undue Burden Test
Even if Casey's undue burden test'0 9 were to prevail over strict
scrutiny in all constitutional questions pertaining to reproductive free-
dom, the Norplant bills should fail that constitutional analysis as well.
An impediment is an undue burden if it is a "substantial obstacle in
the path of a woman's choice"" 0 to bear a child. Under this ap-
proach, a court may assert that the Norplant bills do not force sterili-
zation on welfare recipients because these women voluntarily consent
in exchange for a cash grant. One might argue that paternalistic no-
tions of poor women's inability to make decisions colored by econom-
ics should not control our constitutional jurisprudence. But we have
outlawed surrogacy,"' prostitution," 2 and the sale of organs" 3 be-
cause there are certain situations in which the state simply will not
force a person to choose between body and money. In each of these
cases, the injection of money into the equation makes the incentive a
burden which we have considered undue. To allow coercive manipula-
tion of the rights readily enjoyed by monied members of society is to
create the invidious classifications specifically forbidden in Memorial
107. See, e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. 113, 155.
108. See supra text accompanying note 20.
109. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2819 (1992) (plurality opinion).
110. Id. at 2820.
111. See supra note 87.
112. 63A AM. JUR. 2D Prostitution § 1 (1984).
113. 42 U.S.C. § 274e (1988).
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Hospital and Shapiro. The Norplant bills offer food, to the hungry if
they avoid asserting a fundamental right. Other than an outright ban,
it is hard to imagine a larger obstacle to free choice.
111. Equal Protection and Gender Concerns
Welfare recipients may challenge the Norplant bills on equal pro-
tection grounds as an impermissible gender classification in two ways.
First, men on AFDC114 or other forms of welfare could challenge the
bills on the grounds that they are similarly situated to women on
AFDC, but are treated unequally because they cannot receive a Nor-
plant grant. Second, women could challenge the Norplant bills on
equal protection grounds since "men face no similar threat of repro-
ductive control.""' 5 The Supreme Court has forbidden gender classifi-
cations which uphold archaic stereotypes. 16 In other cases the
Supreme Court has found no gender discrimination because men and
women were not similarly situated." 7
A. Development of the Equal Protection Doctrine as Applied to
Gender Classifications
Gender classifications must be "reasonable, not arbitrary, and
must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial
relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly
circumstanced [are] treated alike.""" The Supreme Court has devel-
oped the principle that gender classifications are impermissible when
based on archaic stereotypes about traditional sex roles, but may be
acceptable in affirmative action programs to help women overcome
114. In 1990, 360,495 male adults received AFDC. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVS., CHARACrESTicS AND FINANCIAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF AFDC RECIPI-
ENTS (FY 1990), microformed on CIS No. 92-4584-7 (Congressional Info. Serv.). There is
no long-lasting contraception for men except permanent sterilization, and vasectomies
would not qualify men for the grants. Marilyn Gardner, Birth Control By Law, TrE
CHRISTIAN Sci. MONITOR, Jan. 15, 1991, at 15. But see H.R. 342, 1993-94 Ohio Reg. Sess.;
and S. 407, 1993 Tenn. Sess., which would provide cash incentives for vasectomies.
115. See Gardner, supra note 114, at 15. For discussion of the male implant in develop-
ment, see Tim Frient, Pills With Pioneering Potential, USA TODAY, Aug. 29, 1990, at D1;
Test of Male Contraceptive Shows Promise, L.A. TiMES, Oct. 18, 1990, at P2. Discrimina-
tion based on the capacity to become pregnant is a gender classification. International
Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 197-200 (1991).
116. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex reL T.B., No. 92-1239, 1994 U.S. LEXIS 3121, at *6-*7
(U.S. April 19, 1994); Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 317 (1977); Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190, 204 (1976); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971).
117. See, e.g., Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 469, 473 (1981) (plurality
opinion).
118. Reed, 404 U.S. at 75 (quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415
(1920)).
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past economic discrimination. 119
Laws implicating gender classifications and challenged under the
Equal Protection Clause are subject to "intermediate" scrutiny.'"
"To withstand constitutional challenge ... classifications by gender
must serve important governmental objectives and must be substan-
tially related to achievement of those objectives."' 21 Applying this
standard in Reed v Reed, 22 the Supreme Court unanimously agreed
that men should not receive preference over women in estate adminis-
trator appointments.'2 Professor Wendy Williams asserts that cases
like Reed are "easy" cases because the classifications in the statutes
are based on clearly outmoded thinking about women's roles, and are
easily invalidated because they reflect "archaic stereotypes."' 24
This clear rule prohibiting gender classifications resting on
archaic stereotypes has broken down, however, when the Court has
confronted gender classifications arguably based on the biological dif-
ferences between men and women. 25 The Court has allowed such
classifications in Geduldig v. Aiello,'26 Michael M. v. Superior
Court,127 and Rostker v. Goldberg.' Because perceived "physical"
differences may in fact be socially constructed stereotypes, the Court
has failed to apply the ban against "archaic stereotypes" in a rational
and consistent manner.129 As Professor Laurence Tribe noted:
Differences that are obviously attributable to social conventions
that the judges themselves have come to perceive as arbitrary
and outmoded-and therefore as mere cultural artifacts sup-
119. See J.E.B., 1994 U.S. LEXIS 3121, at *6-*7 (prohibiting peremptory challenges in
jury selection solely on basis of gender); Califano, 430 U.S. at 317 (upholding computation
of Social Security income based on fewer, higher-earning years for women than men);
Craig, 429 U.S. at 204 (striking down different legal drinking ages for men and women as
invidious classifications); Reed, 404 U.S. at 76 (striking down law favoring men as estate
administrators).
120. See Califano, 430 U.S. at 316-17; Craig, 429 U.S. at 197.
121. Craig, 429 U.S. at 197 (emphasis added); see J.E.B., 1994 U.S. LEXIS 3121, at *17;
Califano, 430 U.S. at 316-17. One criticism of this approach is that courts are incorrectly
concerned with the intent of the state action rather than the effect on the members of the
regulated social group. Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on
Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REv. 261, 353 (1992).
122. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
123. Id.
124. Wendy W. Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts, and
Feminism, 7 WOMEN's Rrs. L. REP. 175, 179-80 n.35 (1982).
125. Id.
126. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
127. 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (plurality opinion).
128. 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
129. See Siegel, supra note 121, at 268-72. Critics argue that the failure to examine the
problem of regulating women's reproduction in social rather than physical terms means the
equal protection doctrine is inadequate to provide sexual equality. Id. at 272; Williams,
supra note 124, at 182 n.50, 193.
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porting only contingent statistical correlations-are insufficient
to justify explicit legal differentiation between the sexes. But
when a gender classification is so woven into the entire social
understanding of women that it reflects what the judiciary itself
still perceives as a genuine gender difference, the plot begins to
thicken. 30
Professor Williams calls these physiology-based decisions the "hard"
cases in which the Court has upheld gender classifications which "con-
cern themselves with other, perhaps more basic sex-role
arrangements.'
13 '
In these "hard" cases, the Court has fallen back on stereotypical
notions of the differences between men and women. Williams argues
that the Court's unwillingness to see biological difference as socially
constructed has prevented it from realizing the similarities between
pregnancy and other disabilities which affect both sexes, or which af-
fect only men. 32 By conducting a "similarly situated" inquiry, the
Court has dismissed the classification as not based on gender, thereby
seemingly making any classification based on pregnancy permissible
for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause.
Williams argues that the tests the Court has articulated in the
"easy" and "hard" cases are different even though the classifications
at issue are not. "The analytical key to [the hard] cases lies in [Justice]
Rehnquist's use of the 'similarly situated' inquiry as an alternative to
Justice Brennan's more finely tuned standard, first enunciated in
Craig v Boren'3 .... requiring that sex classifications 'bear a substan-
tial relationship to an important governmental purpose.""1 34 The two
standards could be interpreted consistently, but,
in the hands of Justice Rehnquist-and [Justice] Stewart-the
"similarly situated" inquiry is in fact a less rigorous inquiry than
the Craig standard would require. In addition, it changes the
nature of the standard in important ways.
The "similarly situated" inquiry is less rigorous because its
adherents do not in fact require that the perceived differences
between the sexes bear a close connection to the purposes of the
legislation. 35
130. LAURENCE TRmE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-28, at 1571 (2d ed.
1988); see also Siegel, supra note 121, at 358 ("Motherhood is the role upon which this
society has traditionally predicated gross stereotyped distinctions between the sexes.").
131. Williams, supra note 124, at 180.
132. For the purpose of a statutes regulating job benefits, argues Williams, pregnancy
should be treated like any other disability which causes a person to be unable to work for a
period of time. Id. at 193-96.
133. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
134. Williams, supra note 124, at 182 n.50.
135. Id.
Sorinz 1994] WOMB FOR RENT
848 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 21:827
Justice Rehnquist's standard, therefore, "preserve[s] sex-based stat-
utes providing they are part of an interlocking statutory scheme
founded on gender differentiations. Thus, sex-based statutes, standing
alone, might succumb to challenge, whereas statutes that are one brick
in a sex-based edifice might be upheld." '136
Other feminist and constitutional scholars have criticized the
Supreme Court's gender jurisprudence in the area of pregnancy. "To
ignore woman's unique role in human reproduction is to allow women
to lay claim to equality only insofar as they are like men." 137 The
"similarly situated" inquiry does not allow for a fair recognition of
these differences in the quest for equality. For example, in Geduldig
v. Aiello, 38 the Court addressed an equal protection challenge to the
California disability insurance scheme. The scheme provided com-
pensation for most disabilities which caused employees to miss work,
but excluded coverage of a normal pregnancy. The Court held that
the state could permissibly cover some disabilities while not covering
pregnancy. 39 In the Court's view, the state accomplished these poli-
cies on an "objective and wholly noninvidious basis .... There is no
risk from which men are protected and women are not. Likewise,
there is no risk from which women are protected and men are not.""
In a footnote, Justice Stewart argued for the Court that Geduldig
was distinguishable from Reed and other equal protection cases hold-
ing gender classifications invalid:
The California insurance program does not exclude anyone
from benefit eligibility because of gender but merely removes
one physical condition-pregnancy-from the list of compensa-
ble disabilities. While it is true that only women can become
pregnant, it does not follow that every legislative classification
concerning pregnancy is [an impermissible] sex-based classifica-
tion .... Absent a showing that distinctions involving preg-
nancy are mere pretexts designed to effect an invidious
discrimination against the members of one sex or the other,
lawmakers are constitutionally free to include or exclude preg-
nancy from the coverage of legislation such as this on a reason-
able basis, just as with respect to any other physical condition.
The lack of identity between the excluded disability and
gender as such under this insurance program becomes clear
upon the most cursory analysis. The program divides potential
136. Id.
137. TRIBE, supra note 130, § 16-29, at 1583; cf. Linda J. Krieger & Patricia N. Cooney,
The Miller-Wohl Controversy: Equal Treatment, Positive Action and the Meaning of Wo-
men's Equality, 13 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 513, 513-57, 565-72 (1983) (arguing against
an "equal treatment" approach to sexual equality).
138. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
139. Id. at 494-95.
140. Id. at 496-97 (footnotes omitted).
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recipients into two groups-pregnant women and nonpregnant
persons. While the first group is exclusively female, the second
includes members of both sexes. The fiscal and actuarial bene-
fits of the program thus accrue to members of both sexes.1 41
Although Congress statutorily overruled Geduldig in the Preg-
nancy Discrimination Act of 1978,142 the case is useful in analyzing the
Court's gender discrimination jurisprudence. 14 3 The California statute
impermissibly reinforced the archaic stereotype of woman as home-
maker by "exemplif[ying] the social judgment that pregnancy is in-
commensurate with employment, graphically illustrating the use of
public power to transform the physiological act of gestation into a
condition of economic dependency."'"
Another case that shows the Court's unwillingness to invalidate
some classifications based on archaic stereotypes is Michael M. v. Su-
perior Court.145 In Michael M., the plurality held that a statutory rape
law under which only men could be convicted did not violate the
Equal Protection Clause.146 As a threshold question, the Court asked
whether men and women were "similarly situated" in regard to the
subject matter of the legislation.147 The Court answered in the nega-
tive; "a legislature may provide for the specialproblems of women.' 1 48
In Michael M., the Court accepted as legitimate the state interest in
preventing illegitimate teenage pregnancies 149 and accepted the gen-
der classification as a differentiation between men and women that
"realistically reflects the fact that the sexes are not similarly situated
in certain circumstances."'150 To justify the classification, the Court in-
dicated that
[b]ecause virtually all of the significant harmful and inescapably
identifiable consequences of teenage pregnancy fall on the
young female, a legislature acts well within its authority when it
elects to punish only the participant who, by nature, suffers few
of the consequences of his conduct. It is hardly unreasonable
for a legislature acting to protect minor females to exclude them
from punishment. 15'
141. Id. at 496-97 n.20.
142. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988) (distinctions on the basis of pregnancy are distinctions
on the basis of sex for purposes of federal civil rights law.)
143. Of Geduldig, Professor Tribe said, "[TIhe choice of men and their needs as a touch-
stone for equal protection analysis is neither natural nor necessary." TRIBE, supra note
130, §16-29, at 1583.
144. Siegel, supra note 121, at 268.
145. 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (plurality opinion).
146. Id. at 468-76.
147. d at 469.
148. Id. (emphasis added; citations omitted).
149. Id at 470.
150. Id. at 469 (citations omitted).
151. Id. at 473.
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The Court did not use the intermediate scrutiny standard in
Michael M. because the classification, according to the Court, was not
truly gender-based. The Court, however, failed to recognize that its
conceptions of teenage women were deeply riddled with archaic ste-
reotypes. It specifically rejected arguments that the statute impermis-
sibly sought to protect only the chastity of women,' 52 although Justice
Brennan argued in his dissent that this was in fact the law's original
goal.153 Professor Williams argues that Michael M. reflects social con-
ceptions of male as aggressive offender and female as passive victim-
conceptions which might not pass the muster of intermediate
scrutiny.:
54
Yet a third case shows the Court's unwillingness to look beyond
its members' own deeply held ideas of gender roles in adjudicating
challenges to gender classifications. In Rostker v. Goldberg,5' the
Military Selective Service Act, which authorized the president to re-
quire selective service registration of men, but not of women, was
challenged under the Fifth Amendment.156 The Court, as it did in
Michael M., applied a lower standard of review after conducting a
"similarly situated" inquiry. 57 The Court indicated that men and wo-
men are not similarly situated in the military context because women
are restricted from participation in combat. 5 8 Therefore, the equal
protection challenge failed because military custom has been to ex-
clude women.1
5 9
In upholding the classification and refusing to apply intermediate
scrutiny, the Court reinforced the archaic stereotype that women are
somehow less than full citizens because they are less capable of na-
tional service. It also promoted the stereotype that women are
weaker than men (and therefore, wisely excused from combat duty),
allowing this perceived weakness to justify a gender based
classification. 60
152. Id. at 472 n.7.
153. Id. at 494-96 & nn. 9-10 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
154. Williams, supra note 124, at 187. Even if there is some biological link between sex
and sexual propensities, the socialization process has exacerbated it to the extent that its
use as a basis for legal classification is unjustified. Id. at 179-90.
155. 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
156. The Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause prohibits the federal government
from engaging in unjustifiable discrimination. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
157. Rostker, 453 U.S. at 78.
158. Id. at 67. The Court did not entertain an equal protection challenge to this under-
lying practice of excluding women from military combat.
159. Id.
160. "It is [ true that while males as a class tend to have an advantage in strength and
speed over females as a class, the range of differences among individuals in both sexes is
greater than the average differences between the sexes." Hoover v. Meiklejohn, 430 F.
Supp. 164, 166 (D. Colo. 1977).
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B. Equal Protection and the Norplant Bills
Would a case involving a Norplant bill be an "easy" case or a
"hard" one? Would the Court perceive the gender classifications as
based on physiological or social differences? The Norplant bills in-
volve pregnancy, an issue on which even feminist scholars cannot
agree whether women should be treated differently from men.
161
Under equal protection cases such as Geduldig and Michael M., one
must ask, are men and women similarly situated? If they are, the clas-
sification is truly sex-based, thereby warranting intermediate scrutiny.
If they are not, the Court would not view the classification as sex-
based, thereby giving the statutes legitimacy.162
The bills would tie the administration of Norplant to the receipt
of AFDC. Both men and women receive AFDC 63 and both sexes are
capable of reproducing. But AFDC is not a benefit for those who are
capable of bearing a child. The receipt of AFDC is totally independ-
ent of the pregnancy and birth itself-it is a benefit for poor children
and their parents. Men and women are equally capable of raising chil-
dren after they are born.' 4 Thus, in the context of AFDC, men and
161. See Williams, supra note 124 (supporting an "equal treatment" approach to equal-
ity whereby men and women should be treated the same for all purposes, where differ-
ences, if any, between the sexes, should be analogized to characteristics of the other sex
and treated the same); Krieger & Cooney, supra note 137 (arguing for a "positive action"
approach to equality whereby positive steps (not given to men) should be taken by em-
ployers and society so that bearing and rearing children does not hinder women in society,
particularly the workforce); Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: The Case of Preg-
nancy, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN's L.. 1 (1985) (arguing for an "episodic analysis" approach to
achieve equality in the area of pregnancy whereby women would be afforded special treat-
ment only during the time when she is physically incapacitated because of the pregnancy
and labor).
162. For a critique of the equal protection doctrine in its ability to achieve sexual equal-
ity see Lois G. FORER, UNEQUAL PROTECrION-WoMEN, CHILDREN, AND THE ELDERLY
IN COURT 39 (1991) ("The assumption that the same treatment accorded to biologically...
different individuals will result at all times in legal equality is preposterously illogical. All
too often it yields manifestly unjust decisions. To acknowledge human differences in order
to accord equal protection does not imply inferiority."). As Professor Tribe notes:
[A]n approach to the equal protection clause that is dominated by formal com-
parisons between classes of people thought to be similarly situated is inadequate
to the task of ferreting out inequality when a court confronts laws dealing with
reproductive biology, since such laws, by definition, identify ways in which men
and women are definitely not similarly situated.
TmrE, supra note 130, § 16-29, at 1582.
163. See supra note 114.
164. This same point applies in evaluating an equal protection challenge to a court or-
dered Norplant implantation as a condition of probation. "A reviewing court would be
unable to skirt an equal protection challenge by characterizing the Norplant condition as a
pregnancy-based classification; the defendants in the Norplant cases were ordered to use
the device not because they had the potential of becoming pregnant, but because they had
the potential of becoming parents. Male child abusers share this same potential." Melissa
Burke, Note, The Constitutionality of the Use of the Norplant Contraceptive Device as a
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women are similarly situated.
The state might argue that men and women are not similarly situ-
ated for the purposes of the Norplant bills because there currently
exists no long-lasting contraceptive for men. This lack of male contra-
ception, however, does not exist in a vacuum. It reflects a societal bias
that women are responsible for birth control. This is symbolized by
the hesitancy of stores to sell male contraception and of consumers to
buy it.'65 It is likely that pharmaceutical companies have been en-
couraged by these market forces to develop female contraceptives
such as Norplant at a faster rate than male contraceptives. To enforce
a Norplant bill without a parallel incentive for men to use contracep-
tion reinforces the stereotype that it is the woman's responsibility to
avoid pregnancy. For a more just determination of sex roles, one must
recognize that men and women are equally responsible for the use of
contraception when the goal is to avoid procreation. They are, there-
fore, "similarly situated." To reason otherwise would use an archaic
stereotype to justify a gender classification.
The state might argue that women are biologically more fit to be
child-rearers, or, less controversially, that it is rational to give the ben-
efit only to women because, as a statistical matter, the majority of
child-rearers are women. As in Michael M., the state might argue on
this basis that men and women are not similarly situated. The first
assertion, however, confuses a physical difference with one that is so-
cially constructed, an archaic stereotype. The latter proposition also
rests on a historical assumption which arose through past and present
sexual role-typing and workplace discrimination. This justification
just as surely rests on and promotes archaic and overbroad
generalizations.
In Califano v. Webster,"6 the Court disapproved of "casual as-
sumptions that women are 'the weaker sex' or are more likely to be
child-rearers or dependents."'167 Instead, "[t]he law must be prepared
to act to make those stereotypes less accurate reflectors of our world,
by affirmatively combating the inequities that result when we all too
casually allow biological differences to justify the imposition of legal
Condition of Probation, 20 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 207, 241 (1992) (concluding that such
orders should be struck down under the Fourteenth Amendment).
165. See Cynthia W. Cooke, Shielding Greed, "Tm NATioN, Mar. 29, 1986, at 464, 466-
67 (book review) (alleging that those who evaluate contraceptives overplay dangerous side
effects to men but underplay dangerous effects to women); Feminine Hygiene Heads for
Big Growth; Sales Statistics, PROGRESrsvE GROCER, Aug. 1986, at 56 (alleging that super-
markets have been resistant to selling male contraception as opposed to female
contraception).
166. 430 U.S. 313 (1977).
167. Id.
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disabilities on women." '168 Furthermore, in Craig v. Boren,'69 "in-
creasingly outdated misconceptions concerning the role of females in
the home rather than in the 'marketplace and world of ideas' were
rejected as loose-fitting characterizations incapable of supporting state
statutory schemes that were premised upon their accuracy."' 7
The state might further assert that the classification is not based
on archaic stereotypes because it is not forcing women to bear chil-
dren, reinforcing their roles within the home, but is preventing their
fate as domesticians. But this argument fails to tailor its inquiry to the
purpose of the bills. A chief premise of the Norplant bills is that many
women on welfare irresponsibly burden our system by bearing chil-
dren they cannot support. AFDC, however, is a benefit for parents
with children-men receive it for the same reasons that women do.
To uphold its ban against archaic stereotypes, the Court must conduct
its inquiry with the purpose of the statute in mind.
Under the Craig standard, "classifications by gender must serve
important governmental objectives and must be substantially related
to achievement of those objectives."'' The state could assert the
same interests discussed in the right to privacy/strict scrutiny argu-
ment: saving money, protecting potential children from being born
into poverty, and providing poor women the financing necessary to
make educated and informed decisions about their reproductive
lives.'72 The analysis for assessing the value of these interests under
an equal protection argument would be identical to the privacy
discussion.7"
The Norplant bills do not further the only interest strong enough
to justify the discrimination inherent in the bills: providing poor wo-
men the financing necessary for true reproductive choice. The finan-
cial incentive, in fact, serves as a barrier to freedom of choice by
offering an incentive favoring Norplant over other methods of
contraception.
Even if a court determined that any of these interests were suffi-
ciently important, the Norplant bills would still fail constitutional scru-
tiny for failure to fulfill the requirement that the justification bear a
substantial relation to the achievement of the government objective.
Although one might argue that because women are statistically more
likely to rear children, Craig negates this justification as a sufficient
basis for a finding that the means specified are substantially related to
168. TRIBE, supra note 130, § 16-29, at 1577.
169. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
170. Id. at 198-99.
171. Id. at 197.
172. See supra Part II.C.l.a.
173. See supra Part ILC.1.
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supporting that interest.17 4 In striking down a statute which set differ-
ent ages at which men and women could purchase beer, the Court
said, "[S]ocial science studies that have uncovered quantifiable differ-
ences in drinking tendencies dividing along both racial and ethnic
lines strongly suggest the need for application of the Equal Protection
Clause in preventing discriminatory treatment that almost certainly
would be perceived as invidious." 75 Because the reason for a wo-
man's increased likelihood of rearing her children has to do with so-
cial rather than biological differences, reinforcing this stereotype of a
woman's place in the home would run contrary to the equal protection
cases purporting to promote gender equality.
Conclusion
As state legislatures are forced to make the difficult budget cuts
called for in recent times, it is likely that welfare will be a consistent
target of these cuts. A long-lasting and effective contraceptive like
Norplant presents tempting opportunities for politicians to exercise
fiscal and social control, and it is likely that temporary sterilization
statutes will pass and be challenged. Because the Norplant grants
would effectively deprive poor women of reproductive freedom by co-
ercively renting their wombs, and because the Court has a long history
of protecting a woman's procreative and contraceptive choice, the
Court should subject the Norplant bills to a strict scrutiny analysis.
This historical protection is extremely important in light of the most
recent abortion decisions, particularly Casey, which serve as a source
of confusion in the area of privacy law. The Norplant bills impinge
upon a woman's constitutional rights by penalizing the exercise of her
right to have children or to choose her contraceptive method. She
cannot receive "special assistance grants" unless she consents to Nor-
plant implantation.
These bills should fail a strict scrutiny or even the lesser undue
burden test. The bills should also fail a proper equal protection chal-
lenge based on gender because reproductive control is only brought to
bear against women. The reasons for greater opportunity to control
women rather than men have to do more with societal bias than lack
of scientific ability. Men would face no similar invasion of their repro-
ductive freedom, nor would they be able to partake in any monetary
174. Craig, 429 U.S. at 202; see J.E.B., 1994 U.S. LEXIS 3121, at *21 n.11.
175. Id. at 208. "Thus, if statistics were to govern the permissibility of state alcohol
regulation without regard to the Equal Protection Clause as a limiting principle, it might
follow that States could freely favor Jews and Italian Catholics at the expense of all other
Americans, since available studies regularly demonstrate that the former two groups ex-
hibit the lowest rates of problem drinking." Id. at 208 n.22; see J.E.B. 1994 U.S. LEXIS
3121, at *21 n.11.
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benefit of the grant programs. Women and men do not receive equal
protection of the laws within such a scheme.
Because the poor and women are underrepresented in the judici-
ary, courts must discern social realities imposed by the legislation on
poor women-realities which might not otherwise be self-evident.
The state, which acts as protector of many civil rights, has no place in
purchasing a person's right to exercise them. Moreover, the law and
courts should not be used as a sword for the oppression of women.
Any statute or regulation offering financial incentives to women on
welfare to be implanted with Norplant should have no place in our
law.
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